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MULTINATIONAL ANTITRUST:
LESSONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
Douglas H. Ginsburg*
COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES FROM
AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE. By Ky P. Ewing. The Hague: Kluwer Law
International. 2003. Pp. xxi, 456. $ 110.

The globalization of business has resulted in a host of new issues
facing antitrust regulators. As they rush to meet the challenges
presented by the vastly greater volume of international business
transactions, the increasing consolidation of global business
operations, and the rapid evolution of computing and communications
networks, the regulators leave in their wake an increasingly onerous
burden on businesses engaged in international commerce. There is
little guidance available, however, to the antitrust neophyte who wants
to become familiar with these developments. They, as well as legal and
economic scholars, lawyers, and others already steeped in antitrust law
- or as it is known outside the United States, competition policy will find Ky P. Ewing's Competition Rules for the 21st Century:
Principles from America's Experience1 to be of great help.
Beyond its utility as a user's guide of sorts for regulatory
authorities, Competition Rules for the 21st Century is a book about the
development of antitrust in the United States. It is this latter aspect
that serves as the basis for Ewing's policy prescriptions. He relies upon
the U.S. experience in formulating several conclusions ( or "lessons")
designed to inform future antitrust policies.
The book is arranged as follows: Chapters One and Two present
the challenges to antitrust arising from the increasingly global
marketplace, in the course of which Ewing presents new survey data
on the size of the antitrust authorities in different countries and the
resources they devote to their principle activities; Chapter Three
provides a historical examination of antitrust as it has developed in the
United States; and Chapters Four and Five set forth the lessons Ewing
draws from the U.S. experience. Ewing synthesizes history, case law,
*
Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and
Distinguished Adjunct Professor of Law, George Mason University. B.S. 1970, Cornell; J.D.
1973, University of Chicago. - Ed.

1. Ky P. Ewing is a retired partner of Vinson & Elkins LLP. He has also served as a
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division ,
and is a former Chair of the American Bar Association's Section on Antitrust Law.
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and, as important, economic studies in formulating suggested
guidelines for competition policy. The book is also a useful reference
guide, with citations to hundreds of authorities and seven appendices
ranging from detailed statistics about antitrust and competition
spending across countries to reprints of economic studies.
I.

THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM

Ewing identifies several specific problems facing courts and
regulatory authorities entrusted with administering a national antitrust
law in a global economy. Harmonizing such laws across countries is
one of Ewing's primary concerns, as well it should be. Businesses
currently face a maze of duplicative requirements in effecting
multinational mergers and conflicting rules governing the conduct of
their business activities. Not that attempts at international
coordination have been lacking. Ewing reports several such efforts,
including failed attempts some thirty years ago by the United Nations'
Council on Trade and Development and its Technology Transfer
Conferences to adopt competition codes, efforts by both the OECD
and the WTO - although with slow progress - to harmonize
competition policies, as well as the more recent and arguably more
successful efforts of the International Competition Network ("ICN")
to promote cooperation among national antitrust authorities (p. 51).
Ewing appears most optimistic about the work of the ICN because
of its dedication to "antitrust only; antitrust all the time" (p. 51). The
ICN has already adopted "Guiding Principles for Merger Notification
and Review" and has recommended "best" practices concerning the
"nexus" between the effects of a transaction and the reviewing
jurisdiction (pp. 51-54). The continued success of this international
joint venture is constrained, however, by the difficulties inherent in a
collective effort of this magnitude.
For example, countries across the globe have different reasons for
subjecting businesses to antitrust regulation; some countries are no
doubt concerned with consumer welfare, but others may have adopted
competition laws in order to raise costs to foreign rivals. In any event,
maximizing the benefits of the group may not coincide with the
desired outcome for any individual country.2 The objectives of
regulators in a transition or a developing economy, for instance, are
likely to be quite different from those in a developed economy.
As a result, success is inextricably linked to the ability of the
collective to convince some participants to adopt competition laws
that, while harmonizing the global effort, may inflict greater costs

2. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
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upon them.3 Although Ewing does not delve deeply into the mechan
ics of collective action, he recognizes the difficulty inherent in such
efforts in stating that "real harmonization" is "a distant goal that will
require extraordinary effort and willpower to achieve" (p. 71 n.87).
As Ewing points out later in the book (and as discussed later in
this Review), the United States' century of experience with antitrust
may be a powerful predictor of the pitfalls potentially facing the many
newer competition regimes around the globe. These pitfalls include, to
mention but a few, targeting "big business" at a substantial cost in
terms of lost efficiencies; protecting small (and often inefficient)
competitors merely because they are small; and using competition
policy to redistribute wealth. Many of the lessons learned in the
United States are applicable both to countries new to the regulation of
competition and to countries that have been promulgating and
enforcing such regulations for decades - indeed, the United States
itself could and should (but too often does not) learn from its own
failures and shortcomings in administering its antitrust laws.
For countries new to the field of antitrust, observation and study is
far preferable to learning-by-doing; doing should be limited, at least at
the outset, to such steps as are necessary to prevent practices that, in
the experience of countries with a long history of antitrust
enforcement, have been proven to be anticompetitive. A country
should not, therefore, require premerger notification based solely
upon a merging entity having derived revenues from that country, as
do some of the countries Ewing examines (p. 32). This type of
overreaching sacrifices consumer welfare for no apparent reason other
than the government's desire to collect merger review fees.
Errors of over-enforcement are likely to be particularly costly in
today's high-tech economy, where "information goods" and other
forms of intellectual property account for an increasingly substantial
portion of economic activity. Ewing makes this point in his discussion
of network effects. Direct regulation of the competitive process price controls, for example - in old-economy industries such as
utilities, may impose costs upon both the producer and the consumer
if the regulated price is set too low.4 The cost to the producer is equal
to the difference between the market-clearing price and the regulated
price, multiplied by the quantity supplied, plus the producer's share of
the deadweight loss attributable to units not produced. The burden of
such costs, though, will not necessarily drive the firm from the market;
it will more likely cause the firm merely to produce less than the
3. See Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Contracting Problems and Regulation:
The Case of the Fishery, 72 AM. ECON. RE.v. 1005 (1982).
4. See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES
AND INSTITUTIONS (1971). Of course, there are also losses when the regulated price is set

too high.
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efficient quantity of output. Also, the firm's loss - aside from the
deadweight loss, which is not recoverable - coincides with a
corresponding gain to consumers from the lower price charged on the
quantity actually supplied to the market. In markets for information,
communications, and other network-based goods, however, the cost of
a regulator's error may be much greater if it stymies innovation.
Information-technology industries, such as computer software, are
often characterized by high fixed and low marginal costs - indeed,
marginal cost may be close to zero. In such industries marginal cost is
less important in determining firm behavior; competition may be for
the market (or a sizable share of it) rather than within the market.5 To
the extent a regulated business cannot cover its fixed costs, it may
disappear altogether, and with it, the innovations it may have been
able to bring to the market. Ewing's advice to those countries now
adopting competition policies - specifically, that they should look
closely at the U.S. experience and its episodes of costly and often
fruitless efforts to regulate competition - may not go far enough in
light of the economics of new-economy industries. To the extent
competition authorities in developing countries, and indeed developed
countries such as the United States itself, can learn from these
mistakes, they may avoid the potentially harsher consequences likely
to result from failed regulatory policies in today's high-tech and, not
incidentally, more globalized economy.
***

Not surprisingly, the administration of an antitrust regime comes at
a high price. It is difficult to determine the exact price, however,
because many of the costs are unknowable (e.g., opportunities
foregone due to a blocked merger or a prohibited business practice).
For a lower bound, Ewing tries to calculate the worldwide observable
costs of antitrust and to determine the distribution of resources as
between merger review and anticartel enforcement in each country.
Ewing draws three general conclusions from his analysis: (1) the
globalization of antitrust rules is real; (2) the priority given to anti
cartel enforcement versus merger control varies significantly across
countries; and (3) different countries devote starkly different
percentages of their GDP to competition policy (pp. 21-29).
One of the most interesting statistics Ewing provides is the
percentage of personnel working in "anti-cartel enforcement" as
opposed to "merger and acquisition enforcement" (pp. 27-28). He
reports that in the United States, thirty-eight percent of combined
5. See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY, 261-96 (1999); see also Harold Demsetz, Why
Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).

992

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:988

Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission personnel are
engaged in merger-and-acquisition enforcement, versus only fourteen
percent engaged in anticartel enforcement. This may at first seem an
odd distribution; after all, cartel-busting is generally thought to be the
most important and in fact the primary concern of antitrust.6 Indeed,
William Kolasky, until recently a Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
has stated that "[d]etection and prosecution of hard-core cartels
should be every competition authority's top enforcement priority."7
The implication of Ewing's calculation is that, at least in the
United States, merger review enjoys an unduly prominent position in
the hierarchy of antitrust enforcement activities. Further, Ewing
identifies merger review as a growing phenomenon, practiced by most
of the more than 100 countries that currently have competition laws
(p. 30). And it is a high-cost activity. Ewing estimates the direct cost of
global antitrust enforcement at nearly $11 billion per year, an amount
which goes largely to pay the salaries of public- and private-sector
lawyers, economists, and staff (p. 32). (Again, this figure does not
capture the indirect costs arising from antitrust policies that prevent
wealth-enhancing business combinations or practices.) Clearly, a large
portion of the direct cost is attributable to merger review. Ewing finds
this particularly disturbing in light of his estimate that "[l]ess than 1 %
of . . . global [premerger] filings result in any challenge to the
transactions by governments" (p. 34). Significantly, he notes that the
"United States got along quite nicely without a premerger notification
law for 88 years, relying on the Sherman Act's Section l" (p. 34).
Merger review presents problems in addition to its high direct cost.
Ewing quotes practitioners, regulatory authorities, and academics, all
of whom point to the increasingly difficult task merging entities face in
coordinating and simultaneously complying with a score or more of
premerger reviews in as many different countries (pp. 36-38). The
number of countries reviewing a merger has increased in part because
there are more countries that, like the United States, use an "effects"
test, which requires a premerger filing whenever a merger "may"
lessen competition in that country (pp. 19-20). Of course, actual effects
are likely to be felt in many fewer countries, and in fewer still could
there be any serious concern about an adverse effect upon
competition.
The problem of conflicting competition policies is becoming
significant, as was shown in 2001 when U.S. authorities approved the
merger of General Electric and Honeywell - both U.S. companies -

6. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001).

7. P. 42 (quoting William J. Kolasky, North Atlantic Competition Policy: Converging
Toward What?, Address at the BIICL Second Annual International and Comparative Law
Conference (May 17, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11153.htm).
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only to have the European Union prohibit it. The experience of the
GE/Honeywell merger review presents a good opportunity to explore
the benefits of coordinated policies.8 There is not yet in place,
however, a forum to discuss such differences in regulatory postures
and to weigh costs and benefits to the global economy. An unfocused,
uninformed merger review is more likely in a framework relying upon
uncoordinated country-by-country reviews.
Where and how, then, does one begin to reform the current
hodgepodge of individualized premerger regimes? As previously
stated, Ewing is optimistic about the ICN as a forum for reform
because it has already taken important steps to coordinate merger
review (pp. 51-58). As Ewing acknowledges, however, much work
remains to be done. Further progress may be possible but will surely
be limited by the unwillingness of any nation to cede its role in merger
review to a supranational antitrust authority.9 (The cession of such
authority by member states of the E.U. is not indicative of the
possibilities because it is part of a more general transfer of political
power from national to supranational authorities.)
Ewing raises an alternative, and attractive, solution: refocus the
attention of antitrust authorities upon ex post rather than ex ante
review (p. 34), at least where harm to competition is uncertain (that is,
in all but mergers that would create a monopoly or near monopoly).
Such an approach would require multinational coordination only
when a concern about competition actually arises, rather than in each
instance in which it is thought a merger may have an effect.10
Considering the low percentage of mergers that occasion any
premerger enforcement effort - whether to reshape or to prohibit the
transaction - and the high cost of premerger review, one has to
wonder why the ex post approach has so widely been abandoned in
favor of premerger review.11
Ewing is somewhat generous in attributing the emphasis upon
premerger notification simply to "bureaucratic convenience" - i.e.,
the idea that it is easier to stop something before it happens than it is

8. It is important to note, however, that even substantive coordination will not
necessarily result in agreement; if the GE/Honeywell merger would have produced
efficiencies in the United States but imposed significant welfare losses in Europe, then the
merger review was properly concluded by both authorities.
9. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Scott H. Angstreich, Multinational Merger Review: Lessons
From Our Federalism, 68 Antitrust L. J. 219, 225 (2000).
10. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (prohibiting mergers or acquisitions "where in any
line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly").
11. In a footnote Ewing acknowledges but rejects concerns that ex post efforts are likely
to be cumbersome and ineffective, and "may even hinder creation of useful deals out of fear
of post-closing exposure." P. 64 n.43.
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to undo it after the fact (p. 34). There is an alternative explanation:
premerger review generates rents for both the public and the private
actors engaged in it. Premerger review is particularly attractive to
those whose livelihood depends upon antitrust practice because it
creates work to be done for every transaction regardless of whether
any harm to competition is likely. No finding of actual competitive
harm is necessary in order to generate filing fees and to provide high
levels of private and public employment, particularly for antitrust
lawyers, who prepare and review the premerger notification papers. In
addition, the fee-generating aspect of premerger review may be
particularly attractive to those countries where little, if any, economic
effect from a merger is likely, because their antitrust authorities need
not even waste the filing revenues they receive by employing people to
read the merger notifications.
Anticartel enforcement would also benefit from closer
coordination across countries. Ewing rightly focuses upon the elusive
distinction between a "bad cartel" and a "good joint venture" (p. 45).
For instance, the adoption of a single communications protocol in an
ATM network would provide the greatest benefit to consumers by
allowing them to access their accounts from the largest possible num
ber of locations; that is, positive network externalities would be max
imized. As a result, it is likely that competing banks would try jointly
to establish an industry standard - here a single communications
protocol - in order to discourage wasteful, duplicative efforts and to
deliver the greatest possible interoperability to consumers.
Ewing notes that, in the United States, courts are likely to apply a
"rule of reason" analysis where collaborations may prove beneficial.
He is concerned, however, that agency review may result in rejecting
new practices "if there is any chance, however small, of an anti
competitive effect" (p. 45). This concern is likely to be amplified in the
international arena, where the desire to protect domestic businesses
may lead to a more intensive review of foreign collaborators and to
the rejection of new technology standards.
II.

THE U.S. EXPERIENCE

Our understanding of the problems relating to harmonization of
international competition law, as set forth in Chapters One and Two
of Competition Rules in the 21st Century, is informed by Ewing's
detailed description of the U.S. experience in Chapter Three. After a
brief overview of the history of U.S. antitrust law, Ewing traces the
strange career of the "concentration thesis" in the United States i.e., how measures of industry concentration came to be at the center
of economic thinking, regulatory action, and court decisions. The
concentration thesis gave rise to "presumptions," first adopted by the
enforcement agencies and then given credence by the courts, that
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certain levels of industrial concentration would lead firms to behave in
a nonrivalrous way, resulting in supranormal prices and profits. The
approach was rooted ultimately in Joe Bain's industry studies of the
1940s linking concentration with higher levels of profitability, which
suggested concentration as a key factor in the conduct and resulting
performance of many industries.
The concentration thesis first gained widespread acceptance in
U.S. antitrust law during the mid-twentieth century "merger wave."
The increased levels of industry concentration brought about by those
mergers quickly became the subject of criticism by both economic and
legal scholars. By the 1960s, the concern with concentration, already
prevalent in economic scholarship, had become deeply ingrained in
the law; for example, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States12 and United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank13 the Supreme Court analyzed
mergers almost exclusively in terms of their effects upon concentration
in a relevant line of commerce (pp. 107-12). In 1968, when the
Department of Justice adopted its first Merger Guidelines, they were
likewise "firmly rooted in a structuralist approach" (p. 112).
The widespread adoption of the structuralist approach by courts
and antitrust authorities may be understandable on the ground that it
provided simple benchmarks by which to evaluate a merger for
anticompetitive effects. The problem, however, as Ewing makes very
clear in his review of the economic studies, is that the structural
approach was, even in 1968, no longer widely accepted in economics
scholarship - at least not as a reliable method for predicting an effect
upon competition (pp. 129-44).
Ewing's examination of the concentration thesis highlights both
the lag between economic scholarship and its adoption in antitrust law,
and worse, the tendency of discredited economic ideas, once accepted,
to persist in legal policy.14 This persistence is evidenced by the
regulatory authorities' continued reliance upon the structural
approach in revising the Merger Guidelines even to this day and by
the agencies' continuing reliance, in litigation of merger cases, upon
economically antiquated cases such as Philadelphia National Bank.
What lesson, then, should the reader draw from Ewing's analysis of
the concentration hypothesis in the United States? Ewing rec
ommends dropping from the Merger Guidelines the "presumptions"
- such as concentration levels above which enforcement is presumed
appropriate - and other formalistic "numbers game" approaches that
are implicitly based upon the "structure-conduct-performance"
paradigm (pp. 147-48). But what should take their place? In
12. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
13. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
14. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991).
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economics the structure-conduct-performance paradigm has given way
to more sophisticated modeling of the firm's decisionmaking, such as
noncooperative game theory.15 Is it too soon to adopt game-theoretic
approaches in government enforcement policy and perhaps thereafter
in court decisions? What about the theory of network externalities? If
Ewing's historical documentation of the lag between economic
thinking and legal policy is any guide, then these questions may not be
answered for many years.
III.

LESSONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE

In the last two chapters of Competition Rules in the 21st Century,
Ewing sets forth various lessons from the U.S. experience with
antitrust. The successful implementation of his prescriptions by other
countries is, of course, dependent upon preexisting local conditions,
such as their form of government, level of wealth, and size of the
public sector. But Ewing's lessons are probably instructive even if they
cannot be adopted in their entirety due to local circumstances.
Perhaps the most important lesson Ewing provides is set forth at the
beginning of Chapter Four:
No rational person charged today with writing the antitrust rules for the
United States (or any other jurisdiction) would create the myriad laws,
federal and state, that are now on America's statute books, enforceable
by two federal agencies,

54

"state" attorneys general, and private

persons, containing a bewildering number of exemptions and immunities
granted at both the national and sub-national levels ... under-girded by
a growing "antitrust industry" of bureaucrats, lawyers, and economists

165).
Many of Ewing's lessons, including the last clause of the passage
just quoted, point to a single, perhaps unavoidable conclusion: the
"antitrust industry" has shown an uncanny ability to replicate and
proliferate itself. Ewing claims, seemingly against the weight of
evidence and analysis in his book, that "the U.S. system works fairly
well" (p. 165). Be that as it may, Ewing's depiction of the U.S.
experience is at a minimum a cautionary tale, putting other countries
on notice of the costly - indeed for some less robust economies, the
potentially disastrous - consequences of making unwarranted
interventions into the marketplace under the banner of promoting
competition. This should be particularly relevant to transition
economies and developing countries where, too often, it seems that
officials, encouraged by foreign (usually U.S. and E.U.) regulatory
authorities, believe the adoption of extensive and complex antitrust
laws and policies is required for a competitive domestic marketplace.
(p.

15. See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TiROLE, GAME THEORY (1991); JEAN
TI ROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988).
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Those countries and others considering the adoption of U.S. or
European-style antitrust laws first should look closely at the U.S.
experience to determine whether market efficiencies can be achieved
without creating a large antitrust industry.
Ewing justly criticizes presumptions used to characterize
potentially efficient conduct as unlawful simply because of the
unexamined possibility of a harm to competition. Indeed, many
business practices that were first proscribed by courts as per se illegal
- that is, as presumptively anticompetitive - without the benefit of a
sophisticated economic analysis, are now routinely accepted as
procompetitive or innocuous in most circumstances. For example,
maximum resale pricing was at one time per se illegal but is now
governed by the rule of reason.16
Ewing's discussion of presumptions focuses upon those that would
tend to prohibit certain business practices. Presumptions need not
have this restrictive character, though. For instance, one useful
presumption, although rarely adopted by regulatory authorities or the
courts, would deem new business practices acceptable absent a proven
harm to consumer welfare. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook developed a set
of presumptions along this line in his classic article, The Limits of
Antitrust.17 His proposed "filters" were designed to "screen out
beneficent conduct" and pass to courts only those practices likely to
raise prices and reduce output.18 Further, the default action under
Judge Easterbrook's approach was to allow a practice rather than to
prohibit it, because a market may correct a market imperfection, but it
usually cannot correct an error made by a court. Ewing's specific
lessons from the U.S. experience, discussed below, might best be
considered in this vein - that is, as default prescriptions for courts or
regulatory authorities faced with uncertain or difficult questions either
of fact or of economic analysis. Finally, it is useful, as I have suggested
above, to view presumptions (at least those aimed at prohibiting merg
ers or business practices) as another way of sustaining the antitrust
establishment and expanding its reach; the use of presumptions and
simplistic benchmarks allows investigation and enforcement activities
without the need to find actual harm to competition.
Ewing draws several "specific lessons" based upon the U.S.
experience. His first is to "BELIEVE IN THE 'FREE MARKET' AND
AVOID THE 'INTERVENTIONIST' APPROACH" to antitrust (p. 167).
This obviously is not a prescription that is easily implemented, but it is
wise counsel nonetheless. Markets are to a large degree self
correcting, whereas improvident political interventions in markets are
16. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997).
17. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1984).
18. Id. at 39-40.
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hard to correct.
Another of Ewing's specific lessons is to take care to "GET THE
PURPOSE OF COMPETITION-POLICY R IGHT" (p. 170). He argues that
efficiency, not competition, should be the goal of antitrust policy (p.
180). Manipulating antitrust law to achieve "fair" (meaning low)
prices or to protect "small business" is sure to be inefficient.
Correlatively, "big business" should not automatically be targeted for
public control; large firms have grown large for a reason, and that
reason is usually their superior ability to satisfy their customers.
Ewing ultimately settles upon the notion that it is efficiency that
drives consumer welfare: competition is simply the usual means of
achieving efficiency; it is not an end in itself. In support of this point,
Ewing cites Lawrence Summers, who instanced high-tech networks as
an area where efficiency requires us to rethink our views of
competition and of the competitive process. Summers emphasized
efficiency in stating that the need for common technology standards to
take advantage of network effects "is as plausibly an argument against
antitrust action, because it suggests that dividing those markets will
reduce efficiency, as it is plausibly an argument for antitrust action on
the grounds that monopoly power is more likely."19 Although network
economies do not as readily admit marginal-cost pricing as an
appropriate measure of efficiency, it would be a mistake, as discussed
in Part I, to say that competition is not necessary to achieve efficiency
in network economies. Rather, competition may take a different form:
instead of competing for market share based upon price or
incremental quality advantages, firms may compete for all or nearly all
of the market through more radical forms of innovation.
The U.S. experience with the concentration thesis, as described by
Ewing and discussed in Part II above, sounds an important cautionary
note as we consider the response of antitrust regulators to network
and other new technologies. The structure-conduct-performance
theory of economics, which has since been shown to be "spurious" (p.
101), is still relied upon by courts and the regulatory authorities.
Current economic thinking about networks and information
economics is still nascent and unsettled. At the very least, then, courts
and regulatory authorities should be careful to avoid prematurely
adopting some of these theories for, as Ewing's description of the
concentration thesis suggests, they may be around much longer than
they prove to be reliable.
Another of Ewing's specific lessons addresses the problems
inherent in defining a "relevant market" (pp. 182-83). Before a firm
can be identified as having market power, the contours of the market

19. P. 182 (quoting Lawrence H. Summers, Competition Policy in the New Economy, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 358 (2001)).
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must be determined. The standard approach consists of defining both
a "product" market and a "geographic" market. Ewing finds fault with
that approach because the methods used by regulators are inconsistent
and often bear little relation to the competitive dynamics of the
market in question (pp. 185-87). Ewing raises concerns that
mechanical application of certain "rules of thumb," such as the "Small
But Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price" ("SSNIP") test,
mislead rather than inform regulators (pp. 188-90). The SSNIP test
asks whether "there exist substitutes to which a consumer would
switch in response to a small but significant (i.e., 5 or 10 percent) price
increase in the product in question."20 Ewing criticizes the SSNIP test
because its seemingly rigorous application to the factually complex
task of defining a market gives a false sense of accuracy to what is
really no more than survey evidence (pp. 188-90).21 Ewing advises
regulatory authorities to look more closely at alternative ways of
determining the relevant market, starting with those taught today in
business schools (p. 191).22 Business people, after all, have the greatest
incentive to gauge accurately who their competitors are. If they err,
they lose; if an antitrust regulator errs, we all lose.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Competition Rules for the 21st Century: Principles from America's
Experience concludes with ten "principles for crafting competition
policy laws for the 21st century" (pp. 225-43). These principles
summarize the main points of the book. They indicate a limited role
for antitrust intervention in the marketplace, reflecting the complexity
and uncertainty of economic systems, and a law that is applied, when
necessary, in a focused, fact-intensive, and thoughtful manner. In
practice, implementing such an approach will be difficult. As Ewing's
description of the U.S. experience demonstrates, success in adopting
efficiency-enhancing antitrust policies and enforcing them in their
intended manner is likely to be difficult even if the pitfalls are known
in advance. Those charged with implementing antitrust policies in the
21st century would be well-advised to keep a copy of Ewing's book
close at hand.

20. P. 188 (quoting United States v. Engelhard Corp., 970 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (M.D. Ga.
1997) (quoting Post-Trial Submission of the United States at 8 (No. 6:95-cv-45)))
.

21. Similar critiques have been leveled at regulators' and courts' reliance upon more
standard economic techniques of measuring market power, such as cross-elasticities, in a
relevant market. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust
Revisited, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 24, 25-26 (1991).
22. Ewing cites Michael Porter's "Five Forces/Diamond Approach" as one example. P.
191 (citing M ICHAEL E. PORTER, ON COMPETITION (1998) and others).

